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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

COX ROCK PRODUCTS,
Plaintiff &
Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 20136

WALKER PIPELINE CONSTRUCTION,
and BALBOA INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants &
Appellants.

Respondent's Brief

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by Cox Rock Products, (Cox)
against Walker Pipeline Construction, (Walker), and
Balboa Insurance Company (Balboa), for payment of asphalt
Cox supplied to Neeley Western (Neeley), sub-contractor,
Walker as the general contractor and Balboa as

issve-

of a payment bond.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court, the Honorable
Don V. Tibbs, sitting without a jury on the 25th day
of April, 1984.

The court found for the plaintiff-

respondent Cox and against defendants-appellants Walker
-1-

and Balboa and awarded judgment of $4,431.45, together
with interest, and $1,200.00 attorney's fees.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-respondent Cox seeks the decision of the
lower court to be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
In October, 1982, defendant-appellant Walker,
general contractor contracted with Neeley, sub-contractor,
to perform asphalt patching work for trenches dug
in a waterline construction project for Ephraim City,
the owner of the project.

Neeley purchased asphalt

from plaintiff-respondent Cox to be used in the trench
patching job.

The asphalt was purchased by Neeley and

picked up by Neeley at plaintiff-respondent Coxes batch
plant in CenterfieId, Utah, and transported by Neeley
to Ephraim, Utah.

Defendant-appellant Balboa issued a

payment bond as required by Ephraim City, the owner.
The laying of the asphalt by Neeley was never
accepted by the owner Ephraim City, having been considered
by Ephraim City as defective.

Consequently, Neeley

was never paid for the work and in turn did not pay
plaintiff-respondent Cox.

No defect was found with

the asphalt itself only the placing of the asphalt
in the trenches was defective.
-2-

Shortly thereafter Neeley filed a petition
in bankruptcy and action was brought by plaintiffrespondent Cox against the general contractor Walker
and Balboa.
Asphalt was purchased by Neeley for the job
beginning October 6, 1982 and ending October 26, 1982.
Sometime in November, 1982, plaintiff-respondent
Cox through its secretary Larry Cox telephoned defendantappellants Walker and discussed the situation with Scott
Walker, owner of defendant-appellant Walker.

In the

course of the conversation, plaintiff-respondent Cox
advised Scott Walker of the amount owed for asphalt
purchased by Neeley, and used on the Ephraim trench
job.

(T.R. p. 22) .
During the month of December, 1982, plaintiff-

respondent Cox again telephoned defendant-appellant
Walker, made demand for payment and advised Walker of
the amount ovrod and was told by Walker that since the
laying of the asphalt had been rejected by the owner
Ephraim City, Walker could not pay.

(T.R. p. 22).

A third telephone conversation was had between
Larry Cox with Scott Walker's wife, company owner of
Walker in December, 1982, wherein demand for payment
-3-

was made and the amount owed indicated.

(T.R. p. 23).

On December 28, 1982, plaintiff-respondent
Cox sent by regular mail written notice to defendantappellant Walker making demand for payment and forwarded
a copy of invoices evidencing asphalt purchased by
Neeley indicated the amount of each purchase on each of
the invoices.

Exhibit 4 (T.R. p. 24).

Appellants Walker and Balboa in their answer to
plaintiff-respondent's complaint admitted the existence
of the payment bond put up by defendant-appellant
Balboa.

Appellants acknowledged in their answer that

the Utah Procurement Code applied to the instant case
and only contested that proper notice had not been given.
Defendants-appellants Walker & Balboa never challenged
the applicability of the Utah Procurement Code at
trial.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The ruling of the lower court is fully

supported by the evidence submitted at trial and when
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff must
be affirmed.
2.

The very heart and purpose of a payment bond

is to protect and insure payment to sub-contractor or
-4-

supplier.

Appellant did not contest the applicability

of U.C.A. 63-56-1, et. al. at trial and is now barred
from raising the issue on appeal.
3.

Appellant contractor had actual notice of

the claim and its amount of respondent Cox.

The notice

was given within 90 days of the last material supplied.
4.

The amount of the claim is supported by

invoices signed by Neeley or his agents and all of
such material went to the Ephraim project.
5.

The lower court has the discretion to award

attorney's fees.

The legislature intent was not to

bar recovery of attorney's fees.
ARGUMENT
THE EVIDENCE MUST BE VIEWED IN THE LIGHT
MOST FAVORABLE TO SUSTAINING THE LOWER
COURT'S DECISION.
In O.B. Oberhansley vs. Dell B. Earle, et. al.,
572 P.2d 1384 (Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court said:
We begin by noting that on appeal, the
decision of the trial court is entitled
to a presumption of validity. We are
required to view the evidence and any
inferences drawn therefrom in the light
most favorable to sustaining the decision.
Id. at page 1386.
The Utah State Supreme Court further states in
Del Porto vs. Nicolo, 27 U.2d 286, 495 P.2d 811 (1972):

This court has both the prerogative and
the duty to review and weigh the evidence
and to determine the facts. However, in
the practical application of that rule, it
is well established in our decisional law
that due to the advantaged position of the
trial court, in close proximity to the parties
and the witnesses there is indulged a presumption of correctness of his findings and
judgment, with the burden upon the appellant
to show that they were in error, and where
the evidence is in conflict we do not upset
his findings merely because we may have
reviewed the matter differently, but do
so only if evidence clearly preponderates
against them.
Although there was some discrepancy in the testimony of the witnesses, the trial court having had the
benefit of trying the case, hearing and observing the
witnesses and parties, made various findings of fact.
The findings made by the trial court are all supported
by the evidence at trial.
Since the defendants-appellants Walker and Balboa
seek reversal of the lower court's decision on appeal,
they have the burden of proof to show the trial court
was in error.

B & R Supply Company vs. Bringhurst,

28 U.2d 442, 502 P.2d 1216 (1972).
All of the lower court's findings are supported
by the evidence and accordingly defendants-appellants
Walker and Balboa have failed to meet their burden of
proof.
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POINT II
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER
AGAINST DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS WALKER & BALBOA.
The bid specifications advertised by Ephraim
City the owner of the project required the contract
to secure both a performance and a payment bond.
was the low

Walker

bidder and awarded the contract and

secured a performance and payment bond from Balboa.
The Utah Procurement Code creates some ambiguity
with regard to the act and its requirements applying
to counties and municipalities.

The Utah Procurement

Code is set forth statutorially in Utah Code Annotated,
Section 63-56-1, et. al., 1953 (as amended); the code
provides:
Except as provided in Section 63-56-3,
this chapter shall apply to every expenditure
of public funds irrespective of their source,
including federal assistance by any state
agency under any contract. It shall also
apply to the disposal of state supplies.
63-56-2 (2) , (Emphasis Added)
The obvious intent of the legislature could
not have been to deny recovery to sub-contractors,
materialmen, and suppliers of public contracts involving
cities, towns and counties who have required performance
and payment bonds.

There would be no purpose for obtaining
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a payment bond to insure payment to sub-contractors,
materialmen and suppliers if action could not be brought
against the bond.

The very heart and purpose of the

payment bond is to protect sub-contractors, suppliers
and materialmen to insure payment for their service,
suppliers, labor or materials,

Most all public

contracts, including the one in the instant case,
are funded by grant or financial arrangements involving
creditors.

Creditors require as a condition of the

financing or grant, that such bonds as payment bonds
be required.

To require a payment bond, have one

provided, only to find that the payment bond is unreachable arrives at an inequitable and unreasonable
result and accordingly denies the very purpose of a
payment bond.
Section 63-56-1 et. al., was not raised by
pleadings or at trial by Walker and Balboa as a defense
with regard to its applicability to the instant case.
Walker and Balboa in fact admitted the applicability
of the statute and only challenged Coxes failure to give
proper notice within the 90 day period required by
the above referred to statute.

-8-

(Section 63-56-38)

Walker and Balboa admitted in paragraph 1 of
their answer, that Balboa put up the payment bond
as set forth in plaintiff's complaint.

Walker and

Balboa are barred from raising 63-56-1 et. al. on
appeal since their pleadings admit the statutes
applicability and the existence of the payment bond
and are now barred on appeal from raising the same.
In the event a determination is made that
the Utah Procurement Code does not apply to the
facts of this case, to bar recovery against Balboa
on the payment bond would be to deny the very purpose
for which the payment bond was required and exists,
that being to insure that sub-contractors, materialmen and suppliers are paid for their services, labor,
material, etc.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT PROPER NOTICE
WAS GIVEN IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
The first asphalt supplied by Cox was delivered
to the Ephraim project on the 6th day of October, 1982.
The last asphalt supplied by Cox to the Ephraim project
was delivered October 26, 1982.

(See Exhibit 1 invoices).

Because of Ephraim City's rejection of Neeley's
laying or placing in the trenches of the asphalt, the

-9-

fact that he did not get paid for the same, and his
petition in bankruptcy prompted Cox in November to make
a telephone call to Walker, wherein Cox advised Walker
of the situation, advised Walker of the amount of asphalt supplied by Cox, and the amount owed and made
demand for payment.

(T.R. p. 22) .

Sometime prior to the 28th day of December, 1982,
Cox had a second telephone conversation with Walker
wherein demand was made and the dollar cimount specified
to Walker for asphalt supplied to his project in
Ephraim by Cox

(T.R. p. 19).

A third telephone conversation occured between
Cox and Scott Walker's wife, co-owner of Walker in
December of 1982.

Demand was made for the amount owed

for the asphalt and the amount was specified.

(T.R.

p. 23).
On December 28th, 1982, by regular mail Cox
sent a letter to Walker demanding payment together
with all invoices for asphalt supplied by Cox with
the purchase price specified on each invoice.
This action was taken and this notice was given
within the 90 day period required in Section 63-56-38
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, (as amended).
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The Utah State Supreme Court had not had occasion
yet to consider the notice issue here presented and
therefor the court has never construed the notice
requirements of Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-56-38.
However, there exists a federal statute, 40 U.S.C.
Section 270B, referred to as the Miller Act, the state
and federal statute are essentially exactly the same.
40 U.S.C.A. Section 270B (a), provides as follows,
to-wit:
Every person who has furnished labor or
material in the prosecution of the work
provided for in such contract, in respect
of which a payment bond is furnished under
Section 270A of this title and who has not
been paid in full therefor before the
expiration of a period of ninety days after
the day on which the last of the labor was
done or performed by him or material was furnished or supplied by him for which such
claim is made, shall have the right to sue
on such payment bond for the amount, or
the balance thereof, unpaid at the time
of institution of such suit and to prosecute
said action to final execution and judgment
for the sum or sums just due him: Provided
however, [t]hat any person having direct
contractual relationship express or implied
with the contractor furnishing a payment bond
shall have a right of action upon the said
payment bond upon giving written notice to
said contractor within ninety days from the
date on which such person did or performed
the last of the labor or furnished or supplied
the last of the material for which such
claim is made, stating with substantial
accuracy the amount claimed and the name of
the party to whom the material was furnished
or supplied or for whom the labor was done
or performed. Such notice shall be served
-11-

by mailing the same by registered mail,
postage prepaid, in an envelope addressed
to the contractor at any place he maintains
an office or conducts his business, or his
residence, or in any manner in which the
United States Marshal of the district in
which the public improvement is situated
is authorized by law to serve summons.
Numerous decisions have been decided on the federal
statute.

The Utah State Supreme Court gave application

to the federal statute in Whiting Brothers Construction
Company vs. M & S Construction and Engineering Company,
et. al., 18 U.2d 43, 414 P.2d 961 (1966).

The issue

presented in the Whiting Brothers case was whether a
materialman or supplier is precluded from recovery
from a contractor's surety by reason of failure
to strictly comply with written notice to the prime
contractor within ninety days.

The court found that

the prime contract had never received written notice
of the materialmans claims but through oral conversation,
had actual notice of the claim and held that the materialman was entitled to recovery against the contractor
and surety, since the contractor had actual knowledge
and statute had been complied with.

The court said

at page 44:
The law to protect laborers and materialmen
and sub-contractors, and it should be
literally construed to effect its purpose.
-12-

The purpose of the ninety days notice was
to enable the prime contractor to protect
himself and his surety against a delinquency
or defaulting sub-contractor.
Also a similar decision was reached in Houston
Fire & Casualty Insurance Company vs. United States
of America for the use and benefit of the Trane
Company, 217 F.2d 727 (1954).
In Fleisher Engineering & Construction Company
et. al. vs. United States for the use and benefit
of Hallenbeck, 311 U.S. 15 (1940); the materialman
failed to send notice of claim by registered or certified
mail and sent the claim by regular mail.

The court

held that regular mail satisfied the requirements
of the statute, the materialman was not precluded
from recovery because he had failed to send notice
by registered or certified mail.

The court said at

page 83:
In giving the statute a reasonable construction
in order to effect its remedial purpose, we
think that a distinction should be drawn between
the provisions explicity stating the condition
precedent to the right to sue and the provision
as to the manner of serving notice. The
structure of the statute indicates that distinction. The proviso, which defines the condition precedent to suit, states that the
materialman or laborer M[slhall have a right
of action upon the said payment bond upon
giving written notice to said contractor",
within ninety days from the date of final
performance. The condition as thus expressed
-13-

has fully met. Then the statute goes on
to provide for the mode of service of the
notice. "[S]uch notice shall be served by
mailing the same by registered mail, postage
prepaid", or "in any manner" in which the
United States Marshal "is authorized by
law to serve summons". We think that the
purpose of this provision as to manner of
service was to assure receipt of the notice,
not to make the described method mandatory
so as to deny right of suit when the required
written notice within the specified time had
actually been given and received. In the face
of such receipt, the reason for a particular
mode of service fails. It is not reasonable
to suppose that Congress intended to insist
upon an idle form. Rather we think that
Congress intended to provide a method which
would afford sufficient proof of service
when receipt of the required written notice
was not shown".
The same analysis was given and conclusion
reached in United States for use of Birmingham Slag
Company vs. Perry et. al., 115 F.2d (1940).
Based on the evidence submitted to the tricil
court, the court found that the general contractor
Walker had actual notice of the amount due Cox for
asphalt supplied and that such notice was given within
ninety days of last delivery.

The court's finding

of the actual notice given is fully supported by
the facts and evidence adduced at trial.
POINT IV
THE AWARD OF $4,4 31.45 FOR ASPHALT DELIVERED
IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
-14-

All invoices for asphalt supplied by Cox to
Neeley were admitted into evidence, totalling $4,431.45.
All of the invoices were signed by Dennis Neeley or
his employees.

At the request of Neeley, each invoice

had written on it a number assigned by Neeley to
the Ephraim project, by the Cox scales operator or were
designated for the Ephraim project.

(T.R. p. 47).

Neeley testified that all of the asphalt

as

evidenced by the invoices submitted went to the Ephraim
trench project.

(T.R. p. 48). And that during the

month of October, 19 82, Neeley performed no other
asphalt jobs.

(T.R. p. 49). Neeley further testified

that no asphalt was rejected by Ephraim City or
any inspector for the project.

(T.R. p. 49).

Walker contended that the first delivery of
asphalt by Neeley to the Ephraim job, was on October
19, 1982, and on that same day two loads of asphalt
were rejected and did no go into the job because
they had stayed on the truck too long and become too
cold.

However, no invoice existed for the 19th day

of October, 1982, and when presented with this
inconsistency, Walker's explanation was that the scales
person wrote the wrong date down or there was an
additional invoice that was missing.
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(T.R. p. 84).

Walker further contends that only 110 to 120
tons

of asphalt were needed to complete the job based

on the trench dimensions.

This estimate of needed

tonage was based on placing the concrete in the trench
at a depth of three inches.

Larry Cox testified

that he visited the site while asphalt was being
placed on two different occasions and observed the
trenches to be between five and six inches deep.
(T.R. p. 15).
Neeley also testified that in some places
the asphalt was placed to a depth of five inches.
(T.R. p. 50).
The court's finding and awarding $4,431.45 is
fully supported by the evidence.
POINT V
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING
ATTORNEY'S FEES.
All of the invoices (See Exhibit No. 1 ) , provided
a clause for payment of attorney's fees in the event
of non-payment and court action.

All of the invoices

were executed by either Dennis Neeley or his employees.
This agreement to pay attorney's fees should carry
through to the issuer of the bond and the general
contractor.
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While there appears to be a period between
1980 and 1983 when the Public Contract Code, Section i
14-1-1 et. al., was replaced by the Utah Procurement
Code, surely it was not the intent of the legislature
to leave sub-contractors, suppliers and materialmen
without a remedy against the bond and the general
contractor.

In any event, the lower court certainly

has the discretion to make an award of attorney's fees.
Accordingly, the lower court's award of attorney's fees
was not in err.
CONCLUSION
Appellants admitted in their answer that a bond
for payment had been furnished by Balboa.

At the time

of trial, appellants admitted a payment bond had been
furnished, (T.R. p. 8) the existence of the payment
bond was admitted and not an issue in the lower court
and appellants are now barred from challenging the
existence of the bond.
Appellants admitted in their answer the applicability of the Utah Procurement Code in the instant
case.

They challenged only that under the Utah

Procurement Code proper notice had not been given
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to the general contractor within ninety days after
the last material was supplied.

Notice was properly

given within ninety days after the last delivery
of asphalt; appellant Walker had actual notice
of the obligation and the amount owed.
Even if the Utah Procurement Code is not
applicable to the instant case, it was not the intent
of the legislature to deny a supplier of materials
recovery on a payment bond.

The very purpose of the

payment bond is to protect suppliers such as respondent.
The lower court acted within its discretion
in awarding attorney's fees and did not err. The findings
of the trial court and award of judgment are fully
supported by the evidence heard at trial.
DATED this

/3

day of February, 19 85.

Respectfully Submi-fcted,

Attorney tor
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Plaintiff-Respondent
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